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More on the Relationship between Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in the 
UK: Evidence from the Application of Generalized Method of Moments Estimation 
Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance compliance and firm 
performance in the UK. We develop a Governance Index and investigate its impact on corporate 
performance after controlling for potential endogeneity through the use of a more robust 
methodology Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Our evidence is based on a sample of 
435 non-financial publicly listed firms over the period 1999-2009. In contrast to earlier findings 
in the UK literature, our results suggest that compliance with corporate governance regulations 
is not a determinant of corporate performance in the UK. We argue that results from prior 
studies showing a positive impact of corporate governance on firms’ performance may be 
biased as they fail to control for potential endogeneity. There may be a possibility of reverse 
causality in the results of prior studies due to which changes in the internal characteristics of 
firms may be responsible for the corporate governance compliance and performance 
relationship. Our findings are based on GMM, which controls for the effects of unobservable 
heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity and thus present more robust conclusions 
as compared to the findings of previously published studies in this area.  
 
Keywords:   Corporate Governance, Governance Index, Firm Performance, Endogeneity, 
GMM 
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1.  Introduction  
The impact of corporate governance on corporate performance has been the main theme of 
many research projects in accounting, finance and management literature. While considering 
governance regulation, it is expected that protection of shareholders’ rights is given by firms’ 
compliance with corporate governance recommendations. Thus the theoretical aim of 
complying with the UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) provisions is to 
reduce agency costs and improve corporate performance. This is consistent with agency theory 
as described in Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1986). Managerial signalling theory also 
indicates that complying with the code of corporate governance is a primary signal to markets 
that the management follows better governance structure. This can lead to an increased demand 
for shares by investors, which will increase share prices and the shareholders’ wealth (Beiner, 
Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann, 2006; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 
2002). It is thus expected that companies which adopt recommendations of the Governance 
Code are likely to enhance their corporate performance.   
 
However, if compliance with corporate governance is endogenously chosen by firms, then each 
firm will reach the level of compliance in an optimal manner.  In such a situation, no 
relationship between equilibrium levels of governance and corporate performance should be 
expected (Love, 2011). More specifically, better compliance with the corporate governance 
practices might improve the redistribution of rents between shareholders and managers, but not 
necessarily increase firms’ performance. Thus better compliance might reduce agency costs for 
minority shareholders by disciplining managers and controlling shareholders more effectively.    
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In this regard, results of previous studies on the relationship between firms’ performance and 
compliance with the corporate governance recommendations are inconclusive. For instance, 
Conyon and Mallin (1997) and Peasnell, Pope and Young (1998) indicate improvements in 
corporate performance after issuance of the Cadbury Report in 1992 (which recommends the 
adoption of some internal monitoring mechanisms with the aim of promoting shareholder 
interests). By contrast, Weir and Laing (2000) and Weir, Laing and McKnight (2002) do not 
find a significant relationship between complete compliance with corporate governance as 
contained in the Cadbury Report and firms’ performance. They however, reported an increase 
in the number of firms which follow good corporate governance practices after the Cadbury 
Report. Similarly, Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003), Brown and Caylor (2006), Bozec, Dia & 
Bozec (2008) and O’Connor (2012) indicate a positive association between governance and 
firms’ performance. Moreover, other studies, such as, Core, Guay & Rusticus (2006), Gupta, 
Kennedy & Weaver (2009) and Pandeya, Vithessonthia and Mansi (2015) report an 
insignificant relationship between governance and firms’ performance.   
 
The rationale for an association between corporate governance compliance and firms’ 
performance arises because better governance enhances efficiency in the monitoring of 
managerial activities.  This in turn, encourages managers to pursue value-maximizing projects 
and to avoid expropriation of firms’ resources such as perquisites consumption (Love, 2011). 
In addition, better governance increases investors’ protection by limiting expropriation of 
firms’ resources from the majority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 
2003). There is also evidence of a decrease in the likelihood of corporate insolvency as a 
function of corporate governance characteristics because governance compliance improves the 
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prospects for greater access to external funding (Claessens, Djankov & Klapper, 2003; Fich 
and Slezak, 2008; Amana and Nguyen, 2013). In contrast, firms might comply to an optimal 
level of corporate governance practices, which would not have a causal effect on performance 
since corporate governance compliance could be endogenously determined.  In such a case 
there would be no observable relationship between governance and firms’ performance (Love, 
2011).  
 
Keeping all the above mentioned points in mind, this study specifically controls for the effects 
of endogeneity and examines the impact of corporate governance compliance on firms’ 
performance in the UK. We choose the UK for this investigation because it offers an 
environment where corporate governance regulations are optional, unlike the US where 
compliance is required by the US corporate law. Our findings contribute to the existing 
literature in at least two different ways.  First, we address aspects of endogeneity that have been 
ignored or treated with arbitrary assumptions in previous research. While doing this we apply 
a dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator.1 More specifically, we control 
for endogeneity that arises from: (i) unobservable heterogeneity - firm fixed effects; (ii) 
simultaneity - better corporate governance compliance leads to better performance, or 
alternatively, better performance leads to better corporate governance compliance; and, (iii) 
dynamic endogeneity - the possibility that contemporaneous compliance with the Governance 
Code is a function of past performance.  
 
                                                 
1  See Roodman (2009) for a description and details of dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator. 
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Second, we develop a governance index with fifteen provisions based on the UK Combined 
Code of Corporate Governance (2003), which is more comprehensive than prior UK studies 
(such as, Padgett and Shabbir, 2005; Arcot and Bruno, 2007; Clacher, Doriye & Hillier, 2008; 
Renders, Gaeremynck, Sercu, 2010; and, Mouselli, Abdulraouf & Jaafar, 2014). We also 
include further aspects of compliance with respect to audit committees with different measures, 
such as, the number of meetings held and participation of a financial expert in the committees 
and believe that the use of all the additional measures would help in identifying and explaining 
the governance compliance - performance relationship.  
  
We find no significant evidence to suggest that current or past compliance with good corporate 
governance practices leads to improvements in firms’ performance. We arrive at similar 
conclusions whether we use accounting or market-based measures of firms’ performance (i.e., 
ROA and Tobin’s Q).  We therefore report two major implications of our results. First, our 
results show the importance of considering the possibility of an endogenous relationship 
between governance and performance. Second, our results suggest that the causal link found in 
previous research, in which good corporate governance practices enhance firm performance, 
might be reversed in the sense that firms with low levels of performance might improve 
corporate governance compliance to signal the market about future performance. This effect is 
also more likely to arise as a result of the increase in institutional investments in firms with 
high level of compliance. This would mean that improvement in corporate governance 
compliance by firms is the result of greater monitoring by institutional investors which select 
high performing firms in their portfolios. We therefore argue that our findings have 
implications for the regulators and policy makers. 
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the process of 
constructing the corporate governance index used in this paper.  Section 3 presents details of 
model specification, data and the sample used in the study.  Section 4 discusses the outcome of 
our empirical analyses and findings of this study. Finally, section 5 concludes this study by 
presenting a short summary of the overall findings, and outlines a brief description of the main 
contributions.  This section also highlights the limitations and specifies avenues for future 
research.  
2.  Corporate Governance Index 
In the UK only a limited number of published studies have considered the impact of corporate 
governance indexes and corporate performance in their research (see for example, Padgett and 
Shabbir, 2005; Arcot and Bruno, 2007; Clacher, Doriye & Hillier, 2008; Renders, Gaeremynck, 
Sercu, 2010; and, Mouselli, Abdulraouf & Jaafar, 2014).  For example, Padgett and Shabbir 
(2005) constructed a compliance index based on 12 corporate governance provisions and 
investigate the relationship between the index and corporate performance. Their findings 
suggest that more compliance with the combined code leads to higher stock returns. Similarly, 
Arcot and Bruno (2007) built a corporate governance index based on eight provisions of the 
corporate governance code and examine its relationship with corporate performance measured 
by return on assets (ROA). They find that firms that become non-compliant for good reasons 
outperform other firms that do comply with the corporate governance code.  
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In order to examine the effect of corporate governance compliance on two performance 
measures, Tobin’s Q and ROA, Clacher et al. (2008) developed an index which is based on the 
UK Combined Code (2003) recommendations. The findings indicate that compliance with 
governance practices improves firm value; however, the effect varies between different 
governance practices, in particular, quality of disclosure and audit are found to be the most 
important practices that positively affect corporate value. They also find a positive relationship 
between ownership structure and remuneration policies and corporate value, however, board 
structure was found to have no significant effect on corporate value. In a similar vein, Renders 
et al. (2010) examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm value for all the 
firms included in FTSE Eurotop 300, including 373 firms from the UK over the period 1999-
2003. By employing the Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) Regression Analysis as their research 
approach the findings of this study show a positive relationship between corporate governance 
and firm value.  
 
More recently, Mouselli et al. (2014) investigate the effect of corporate governance provisions 
on accruals quality and stock returns and employs a corporate governance index provided by 
the Risk Metrics Group. They not only assessed the overall firms’ governance quality but also 
the quality of four sub-categories namely, board structure, audit practices, compensation and 
ownership, and takeover defences. Their findings show the audit practice as the most influential 
provision that positively affect the stock returns of UK firms. These findings are in line with 
the results of Clacher et al. (2008) that also specify a relationship between audit practice and 
firm value.  
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There is also evidence covering the impact of governance indices on corporate performance in 
the US. For example, Gompers et al. (2003) uses 24 corporate governance provisions for 
constructing a governance index as a measure of shareholder rights across 1500 US firms. Their 
findings suggest that firms’ performance vary according to shareholder rights. Similarly, 
Cremers and Nair (2005), Brown and Caylor (2006), Bozec et al. (2008) and Bebchuk, Cohen 
and Ferrell (2009) use the governance index of Gompers et al. (2003) for investigating the 
interaction of corporate control and shareholder activism in the US. Their results support the 
findings of Gompers et al. (2003), suggesting that companies with better corporate governance 
have higher share returns and value.  
 
In contrast to the above while examining the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance, Core et al. (2006) employed the G-Index  developed by Gompers et al. (2003) 
and found insignificant relationship between the two variables.  Similarly, Lehn, Patro & Zhao 
(2007) used the E‐Index, developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009) and again show an insignificant 
relationship between firms’ corporate governance compliance and performance. Furthermore, 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) re-examined the Gompers et al. (2003) results and find no evidence 
of a significant effect of corporate governance practices on stock returns. With a sample of S&P 
500 firms and by employing the corporate governance indexes of Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS), Epps and Cereola (2008) find an insignificant relationship between corporate 
governance rating and performance. Consistent with the above, Johnson et al. (2008) and Gupta 
et al. (2009) also document insignificant relationships between corporate governance 
compliance and firm performance. 
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It is evident from the above discussions that only a few studies have used corporate governance 
indexes in their investigations and the evidence is largely inconclusive (see for example, 
Gompers et al. 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Bozec et al., 2008; Core et al., 2006; and, Gupta 
et al., 2009).  In addition, most of the existing studies in the UK have only used a few aspects 
of governance compliance in the construction of their corporate governance indexes. As a 
consequence, we have constructed a governance index (GI) which addresses several aspects of 
the corporate governance compliance regarding the structure of the board of directors and its 
sub-committees. The index considers fifteen provisions of the UK Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance (2003), as it more generally applies to the time period of our study 
(1999-2009). Under the given guidelines, listed companies are required to comply with the 
recommendations of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) or provide 
justifications in case of non-compliance.  
 
We also apply a dummy coding scheme to evaluate the compliance of UK listed firms with the 
combined code (see for example, Black et al., 2006a; Gompers, et al., 2003; Henry, 2008). This 
method of rating gives a value of 1 if a company complies with a particular provision of the 
Code and zero otherwise. The total score of the Governance Index thus comprises 15 points, 
which indicates higher compliance with the UK combined code.  The factors to construct the 
governance index (GI) are presented in Table 1 which also displays provisions of the combined 
code that are used for constructing the corporate governance index. One limitation of our GI is 
that it only considers the provisions of the Code that can be practically measured and does not 
include those where information is not observable. 
Insert Table 1 Here 
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3.  Research Strategy 
 
Data and Sample 
The data covers corporate governance and financial information of a sample of UK non-
financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) over the period 1999-2009. The 
sample includes all those firms that have been part of the FTSE All-Share Index at any time 
during the sample period.  We include both listed and de-listed companies in the sample which 
constitute a total of 1513 firms. We deleted all those firms for which the corporate governance 
compliance and/or financial data was not available during the sample period. The selection 
criteria resulted in a reduced sample size of 449 companies. In order to meet the requirements 
of the method of analysis used in this research we needed at least four consecutive years of data 
for each company which further reduced the sampled size to 435 firms. As a result, over the 
eleven years sample period, our final sample constituted 3875 firm-year observations. 
 
We use BoardEx database as the main data source for extracting the number of executive and 
independent non-executive directors and board sub-committees. In addition, data regarding the 
number of meetings held by the audit committees and whether or not they have at least one 
financial expert among their members was collected from annual reports of the sample 
companies which were obtained in electronic form from the Northcote Website2. Financial and 
accounting data was extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream database.  Outliers are 
                                                 
2 http://www.northcote.co.uk offers electronic copies of UK companies’ annual reports.  
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controlled in all financial variables by truncating the values to their 99th and 1st percentiles. All 
values outside this range are set to the highest/lowest value within the specified range.  
 
Model Specification 
We initially begin our empirical analysis by considering the number of lags of corporate 
performance which are adequate for capturing the dynamic completeness of our benchmark 
model. In this regard, previous literature recommends the use of two lags for capturing the 
influence of past performance on current data (see for example, Glen, Lee, & Singh, 2001; 
Gschwandtner, 2005). However, we follow, Wintoki, Linck, & Netter (2012) which suggest 
the use of four lags for controlling the endogeneity problem in estimating a regression model 
of current corporate performance.  The regression models include a number of control variables 
with both accounting and market-based measures of corporate performance (ROA and Tobin’s 
Q). We thus employ the following model: 
CPit = α1 + ∑ βpCPit−p
p=4
p=1
+ βxControlsit + εit                                                      (1) 
 
where, CPit  represents corporate performance measured by return on assets (ROA) or Tobin’s 
Q (TQ), and controls represent control variables, which include; sales growth (SALESG), 
capital expenditure (CAPITE), firm size (FSIZE), leverage (LEV), and R&D expenditures. In 
addition, year and industry dummies are also included in the model as control variables. 
1. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets minus equity plus market capitalisation divided by 
total assets. 
2. Return on assets is calculated as earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets.   
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3. Sales growth is measured as the ratio of current year’s sales minus previous year’s sales, 
divided by previous year’s sales. In this regard, Durnev and Kim (2005) document that 
companies with increased sales are more likely to grow faster than other companies. 
Growing firms require greater external financing and are therefore more likely to adopt 
better corporate governance practices for reducing the cost of capital (Beiner et al., 2006). 
In line with the above arguments, previous studies have found a positive relationship 
between corporate performance and firms’ growth (see for example, Gompers et al. 2003; 
and Henry, 2008). 
4. Capital expenditure is measured by the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets. This 
is also consistent with prior studies, where investments and innovative potential of 
companies are expected to have a positive impact on corporate performance (see for 
example, Durnev and Kim, 2005, Black et al., 2006b; Dah, 2016). 
5. Firm size (FSIZE) is calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets.  Firm size is likely 
to have a positive impact on corporate governance mechanisms as a result of scale 
differences in costs of compliance, operations, market regulations, and agency problems 
(see for example, Jensen, 1986; Beiner et al., 2006). 
6. Leverage (LEV) is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets. On the one hand, debt 
plays a crucial role in reducing the agency costs of free cash flows by preventing 
investments in non-positive net present value (NPV) projects and can thus be considered as 
a corporate governance mechanism. On the other hand, debt may increase the likelihood of 
bankruptcy and credit risks, which may deprive a firm from investing in profitable 
investment opportunities (Jensen, 1986). 
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7. Research and development expenditure (R&D) is measured as the ratio of total research 
and development expenditure to total assets. As R&D activities result in new technologies, 
products or production processes, it is expected that it would help in enhancing firms’ 
performance. In this regard, previous UK studies have reported a positive and significant 
impact of R&D on corporate performance (Akbar and Stark, 2003; Poletti-Hughes, 2008; 
Shah, Liang and Akbar, 2013). 
8. Differentials in industrial sectors are controlled with dummy variables. The industry 
classification is based on the first digit of the Industry Classification Benchmark (FTSE, 
2008) which includes eight non-financial sectors: Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, 
Consumer Goods, Health Care, Consumer Services, Telecommunications, Utilities and 
Technology.   
Next, in line with the arguments raised in previous research findings we consider the possibility 
of an impact of past performance on current financial variables and on compliance with 
corporate governance practices (see for example, Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Guest, 2009; 
Wintoki, et al., 2012). In order to examine the presence of this relationship we estimate the 
following model: 
Current Variablesit = α0 + β2CPt −1 + ∑ βi
n
i=1
Controlst−1 + εit                            (2) 
In this equation current variables and controls include GI, SALESG, CAPITE, FSIZE, LEV 
and R&D whereas CP represents corporate performance measured by TQ or ROA. In addition, 
year and industry dummies are included in the model. 
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Furthermore, we test for strict exogeneity among the variables by employing the following 
fixed-effects model: 
CPi,t = α + β1GIi,t + βxControlsi,t + Ω1GIi,t+1 + ΩxControlsi,t+1 + μi + εit     (3) 
 
where GIi,t  represents the governance index and Controlsi,t represents control financial 
variables as explained in equation (1) above. A fixed effects specification is used to control for 
one type of endogeneity, in which time-invariant firm characteristics (fixed effects) may be 
correlated with the explanatory variables. Therefore, if the future values of GI happen to be 
significant in equation (3), it may suggest that the existent endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables may not only be the result of fixed effects, but also because of a dynamic relationship, 
i.e. future realizations of the explanatory variables are associated with current performance. 
Therefore, equation (3) aims to highlight whether future values of GI and control financial 
variables adjust in response to firm performance or by contrast are exogenous (Guest, 2009; 
Wintoki, et al., 2012).  
 
Application of System GMM 
 
In addition to the above analyses, we perform our main analysis through the application of 
System GMM as our preferred technique, and compare the results with estimators obtained 
from regressions performed with OLS and fixed effects. We therefore specify a dynamic model, 
where corporate performance (CP) is either ROA or TQ as follows: 
  
CPit = α1 + k1CPit−1 + k2CPit−2 + βGIit + γxControlsit + μi + εit                               (4) 
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where GI represents the governance index, Controls represent control variables as explained 
above in equation (1).3  
We consider the endogeneity tests from our model estimations and present the results with two 
different specifications with system GMM [GMMa and GMMb]. First, we treat all variables 
except the year dummies as endogenous. This allows the use of instruments from T2 for all the 
explanatory variables and T4 for the performance variables. Second, we consider all those 
explanatory variables which are not strictly endogenous and are thus treating those as 
predetermined.  This allows us the use of an additional lag T1 of all such variables as an 
instrument (i.e., for ROA: GI, LEV and R&D; and, for TQ: GI and R&D). 
There is also the possibility that as corporate governance compliance does not present much 
variation across time, its relationship with TQ could be dissolved as a firm fixed effect. 
However, a problem with fixed effects estimations is that they do not account for time varying 
omitted variables that could be present in the model and/or reverse causality. A way to deal 
with reverse causality is the use of instrumental variables which in our regressions should be 
correlated with the GI index, but do not have a direct relationship with performance. It has also 
been argued in the existing literature that, often, the selection of instruments is based on 
unrealistic assumptions of data, leading to the use of instruments that are not totally exogenous 
(see for example, Durnev and Kim, 2005; and Aggarval et al. 2007, among others).   
 
                                                 
3 The selection of lags to capture the dynamic nature of performance is based on the results reported in Table 4.  
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In order to overcome the aforementioned problems, a dynamic panel data model is estimated 
with System GMM as it allows for the use of past values of the GI index as instruments without 
compromising the efficiency and consistency of the estimators. However, a problem with 
instrumenting explanatory variables with lagged values could cause inconsistency if the 
relationship of the lagged and current values is weak. 
 
In order to obtain estimates of System GMM we apply xtabond2 in Stata (Roodman, 2009). 
We specify the function for small-sample adjustment and report t-statistics and Wald chi-square 
as opposed to Z-statistics and F-tests. The two-step command is also specified to correct for 
finite-sample bias. We use robust standard errors which are consistent with panel-specific 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the one-step estimation. We report the validity of our 
System GMM regressions by testing for exogenous instruments with the Hansen test of over-
identification and the difference in Hansen test of Exogeneity.  
 
We also take into account the effects of autocorrelation in this study by applying AR(2). This 
is a method for testing second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. In 
relation to the contributions of this study the results of this test has implications because the 
presence of autocorrelation would specify that lag of the instruments and dependent variable is 
endogenous.  The outcome of AR (2) suggests the presence of no autocorrelation and justifies 
the validity of our models. Also the instruments appear exogenous and valid as suggested by 
the results of Hansen and difference in Hansen tests. In addition, the validity of the system 
GMM models has also been identified as consistent in all the regressions of this study.4   
                                                 
4 Column (4) of Table 8, is the only exception, where the results of Hansen test of over-identification is significant at the 10% 
level.  
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Finally, in order to analyse the possibility that current level of the governance index has an 
impact on future corporate governance compliance, we follow Wintoki, et al., (2012) and 
estimate whether past compliance with corporate governance determines current corporate 
performance with the following model: 
 
CPit = α1 + k1CPit−1 + βGIit−1 + γControlsit−1 + μit + εit                                        (5) 
 
where CP represents corporate performance, GI represents the governance index, Controls 
represents control variables as described earlier for equation (1).  
4.  Results and Discussion 
Description Statistics 
Table 2 shows the annual means and standard deviations of the GI index, performance 
measures, and other explanatory variables. We can observe a constant annual increase of the 
GI index, which may be the result of the review of the code of compliance over the last few 
years of the sample period. Size, leverage and R&D expenditures show consistent mean values 
over the sample period. TQ reaches a maximum of 3.14 in 1999 and a minimum of 1.31 in 
2008.  Furthermore, the maximum of ROA is 0.99 in 1999 whereas the minimum is 0.04 in 
2002 and 2003.  Table 3 shows the frequency of the governance index scores where 58% of the 
sample firms have compliance level between 81% and 100% whereas only 3.7% of the sample 
firms have compliance level below 40%. These figures show that most of the sample firms have 
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complied with the governance code and suggest an impact of compliance with the governance 
code on current performance.  
Insert Table 2-3 Here 
Table 4 presents results from the estimation of model (1).  We find that the first, second and 
fourth lags of ROA are statistically significant (column 1), whereas only the first and third lags 
are significant for Tobin’s Q (column 2). In columns 3 and 4, we use older lags (year 3 and 4) 
which are significant for ROA, whereas for Tobin’s Q only the lag of year 3 is significant. The 
impact of the estimated coefficients is lower than recent lags, which suggests that although 
older lags explain current performance, such information is absorbed by more recent lags.  
Insert Table 4 Here 
Table 5 shows findings from the estimation of the regression (model 2) using ROA in Panel 
(A) and TQ in Panel (B). We find that the GI index is significantly determined by both past 
performance measures which raise two important issues. First, it might be that there is reverse 
causality in which performance would determine corporate governance and not vice versa. 
Second, corporate governance and performance could be determined simultaneously as a result 
of omitted variables bias. Most financial variables, with the exception of leverage, are also 
significantly associated with past performance, Panel (B). Although Leverage is not 
significantly associated with past TQ, it is significantly associated with past ROA, which 
suggest a certain degree of dynamic endogeneity with firms’ performance. In addition, some of 
the past values of the other financial variables significantly determine current values, 
suggesting that not only GI is potentially endogenous with performance through a dynamic 
relationship but also most of the control variables.  
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Insert Table 5 Here 
 
Table 6 shows results from the estimation of model 3. It indicates that future values of GI are 
not significantly associated with firm performance. This is consistent when future values of 
financial variables are included in the model, as highlighted in columns (2) and (4). Therefore, 
future compliance with corporate governance practices might not vary as a response to past 
performance indicators which would allow the GI index to be considered as predetermined, as 
opposed to endogenous, when applying a more robust technique of analysis that controls for all 
aspects of endogeneity such as System GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Roodman, 2009; 
Kryzanowski and Mohebshahedin, 2016).    
Insert Table 6 Here 
Table 7 and 8 present the results for ROA and TQ as measures of performance, respectively.  
Insert Table 7 and 8 Here 
The first column of Tables 7 and 8 shows that the estimates for the GI index from a static 
specification of the model has a positive and significant relationship between the governance 
index and corporate performance. This finding is similar, in direction and magnitude to 
previously published studies in this area (such as; Gompers, et al. 2003, and Padgett and 
Shabbir, 2005, amongst others). Column (2) in Tables 7 and 8 presents an estimation with fixed 
effects, in which the estimate for the GI index is positive and significant for ROA, but is not 
significant for TQ, which suggest that fixed omitted variables, such as cross-listings or 
managerial experience, might be driving the correlation between better governance and higher 
TQ.  
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In both Tables 7 and 8, column (3) to (6) present results of the dynamic specification of our 
models. The impact and significance of the GI index does not hold when System GMM is 
applied in columns (5) and (6), neither is present in the dynamic OLS regression in column (3), 
or the fixed effects estimation in column (4), which suggests that lagged performance captures 
information of future corporate governance compliance.  This finding highlights the importance 
of specifying a dynamic model in the governance and compliance relationship.  
 
After specifying a dynamic model and controlling for endogeneity, Table 7 and 8, show that 
GI is not a significant determinant of corporate performance. This finding suggests a potential 
bias that could arise when all aspects of endogeneity are not controlled, such as the dynamic 
nature of the performance model, simultaneity and omitted variable bias (unobservable 
heterogeneity).  This finding combined with the results reported in Table 5 highlights the 
possibility of reverse causality where changes in performance levels have a causal effect on 
corporate governance compliance (but not vice versa). This finding suggests that firms 
optimally select their level of corporate governance in response to firm characteristics, such as 
performance (Chidambaran et al., 2008). This finding is also consistent with Shabbir (2008), 
which suggests that UK firms are more compliant when lagged returns decrease and less 
compliant when lagged operating performance increases. 
 
We find a significant and negative effect of leverage and R&D in the performance model in 
Table 7.  The negative effect of leverage is in line with Harris and Raviv (1988), suggesting 
that larger debt might increase the accessibility of private benefits of control as the voting power 
per unit of equity increases, which negatively impacts on performance. The estimated 
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coefficient of R&D expenditure is negative for ROA (Table 7) and positive for TQ (Table 8) 
which is not surprising as the former measures performance from an accounting point of view 
and the later measures future firm economic prospects. This finding is consistent throughout 
the paper independently of the method of analysis.  We find that firm size is negatively 
associated with TQ in Table 8, the magnitude and sign of the coefficients of which are 
consistent with those reported by other scholars (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Durnev and Kim, 2005).  
 
A consistent and significant estimator from GMM regressions is expected to lie between the 
OLS and the fixed effects estimator, or at least should not be significantly higher from the 
former or significantly lower than the latter (Bond, 2009). In line with this, we have checked 
the GMM regression estimators and based on the results reported in Table 7 and 8, it can be 
confirmed that our significant GMM estimators comply with the above condition. This is 
demonstrated by the overlapping 95% confidence intervals. Moreover, as can be observed in 
Table 7, for LEV and R&D, this condition was met at the 1% level of significance. These 
findings re-confirm the robustness of our results. 
 
Table 9 shows the results for both corporate performance measures (ROA and TQ) calculated 
by using pooled OLS and System GMM. The results indicate no relationship between the 
lagged governance index and the contemporaneous performance measures. This finding 
contradicts Vander Bauwhede (2009) who shows that greater lagged corporate governance 
compliance regarding the structure and functions of the board is positively significant in 
determining ROA (estimated with OLS). We find that after considering the likely endogeneity 
of the variables, lagged R&D expenditure is positive and significant in determining TQ, but 
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insignificant for the ROA measure of performance. Likewise, past leverage and past firms’ size 
are significant in determining current TQ. 
Insert Table 9 Here 
In summary, we find that compliance with corporate governance practices do not determine 
current or future performance of firms. This finding is robust to potential endogeneity problems 
that could bias the results.   We also highlight the possibility of a reverse causality between 
performance and corporate governance compliance, which posits that firms choose their 
optimal level of corporate governance practices in response to internal firm characteristics, such 
as performance. In light of all these points we argue that changes in performance levels might 
have an effect on changes in corporate governance compliance by UK firms. 
 
These findings have implications as the absence of a link between corporate governance and 
firms’ performance would naturally raise many questions. Theoretically, compliance with 
corporate governance regulation is expected to help reduce the agency costs and thus positively 
influence both current and future performance of firms. However, empirical evidence in this 
paper does not show a relationship of this nature. This leads us to question the recent calls for 
more stringent regulation and stricter control mechanisms in aftermath of the recent 2007-2008 
financial crisis.  In line with this, our findings support the arguments of Cloke (2013) who 
regards the occurring of various financial incidents, after the 2007 financial crisis as not just 
other episodes in the string of crises which is generally regarded as a normal practice in 
capitalist economies but ‘...a transitional phase towards an entirely different capitalist topology’ 
(p. 99). In light of this if compliance with the existing corporate governance regulation is not 
useful in improving firms’ performance then alternative solutions needs to be explored. Is the 
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free market view of regulation adding value to the debate here?  This is a question which will 
need answers in future research paradigm. 
5.  Conclusion 
In the existing literature the impact of corporate governance on firms’ performance has been 
investigated by using performance as a function of the governance index. However, most of the 
existing studies ignore the dynamic nature of the relationship between corporate governance 
and performance (Guest, 2009; Wintoki, et al., 2012). This study, therefore, examines the 
relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance, using a robust GMM 
specification that accounts for potential endogeneity problems that may have influenced the 
results of existing studies. The findings in our study suggest that, after controlling for all sources 
of possible endogeneity, there is no significant relationship between the governance index and 
corporate performance. This finding is consistent in contemporaneous and intertemporal 
specifications. By contrast, while using the OLS and fixed-effects models as the methods of 
analysis we find that the level of compliance has a significantly positive impact on ROA. This 
suggests that the results of previous studies that do not take into account the dynamic nature of 
firms’ performance may be biased.  
 
In other words, current corporate performance or other control variables in the empirical models 
of published studies may affect the structure of corporate governance in the future. We thus 
argue that investigating the relationship between corporate governance and performance has to 
take into account the possibility of endogeneity arising from three sources: unobservable 
heterogeneity, simultaneity and the dynamic corporate performance. Theoretically, however, 
reporting insignificant relationship between the governance index and corporate performance 
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is unexpected, because complying with the corporate governance best practice should 
essentially be considered as a good sign for perspective investors. The insignificant relationship 
between the governance index and corporate performance may indicate that firms that comply 
with the corporate governance recommendations do not necessarily have higher profitability 
and higher market value than their counterparts that do not comply. The insignificant 
relationship between the governance index and corporate performance may be due to the 
possibility of reverse causality in which firms optimally choose their level of corporate 
governance compliance depending on internal firm characteristics, such as performance. We 
therefore argue that our findings have implications for both the regulators and policy makers. 
 
While our study adds to the existing literature on the governance-compliance and performance 
relationship in different ways, we also acknowledge some potential limitations of our study. 
Our GI index, for instance, only considers provisions of the Corporate Governance Code (2003) 
that can be practically measured but does not include those provisions where information is not 
observable and inclusion of further information about those provisions would certainly add 
more insights. Also, although the issue of reverse causality is highlighted as a possible outcome, 
however, it is beyond the scope of this paper to study all other determinants of corporate 
governance compliance which may have implications on the findings of this research. Covering 
a detailed investigation of all these aspects is therefore left to future research. 
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Table 1 
 
Construction of the Governance Index  
 
Corporate Governance 
Variables 
Acronym Code Section(s) 
/ Page No. 
Explanations 
1. Board of Directors 
Chairman and CEO DUAL A.2.1(P.6) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the roles of chairman and 
chief executive are not combined, 0 otherwise.  
Board Structure NED A.3.2(P.7) A dummy variable equal to 1 if half or more of directors 
are independent non-executive directors, 0 otherwise. 
Chairman CHA A.2.2(P.6) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the board chairman is 
independent non-executive director, 0 otherwise. 
Senior independent 
director 
SEN A.3.3(P.8) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has an 
independent non-executive senior, 0 otherwise. 
 
2. Board Sub-Committees 
Remuneration Committee 
Presence RC A.1.2 & 
B.2.1(P.6 & 
P.15) 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has a 
remuneration committee, 0 otherwise. 
Structure RCS B.2.1 (P.15) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the remuneration 
committee has at least three independent non-executive 
directors, 0 otherwise. 
Chairman of 
remuneration committee 
CRC B.2.1 (P.65) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the chairman of the 
remuneration committee is independent, 0 otherwise. 
Audit Committee    
Presence AC C.3.1 (P.17) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has an audit 
committee, 0 otherwise.  
Structure ACS C.3.1 (P.17) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit committee has 
at least three independent non-executive directors, 0 
otherwise. 
Financial expert ACF C.3.1 (P.17) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit committee has 
at least one financial expert, 0 otherwise. 
Chairman CAC C.3.1 (P.17) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the chairman of the audit 
committee is independent, 0 otherwise. 
Meetings ACM C.3 (P.17) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit committee 
holds at least three meetings a year, 0 otherwise. 
Nomination Committee    
Presence NC A.4.1 (P.67) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has a 
nomination committee, 0 otherwise. 
Structure NCS A.4.1(P.67) A dummy variable equal to 1 if more than half of 
members of the nomination committee are independent 
non-executive directors, 0 otherwise. 
Chairman CNC A.4.1(P.67) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the chairman of the 
nomination committee is independent, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2 
 
Variables Means and Standard Deviations (Italics) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Firms in FTSE-
All 
811 790 754 715 689 695 688 681 673 618 622 
No. firms 318 330 345 369 383 408 418 425 425 426 424 
% of the sample 39% 42% 46% 52% 56% 59% 61% 62% 63% 69% 68% 
TQ 3.14 2.71 1.90 1.45 1.90 2.01 2.15 2.29 2.00 1.31 1.62 
 3.14 2.71 1.39 0.81 1.49 1.39 1.41 1.50 1.37 0.94 1.31 
ROA 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.05 
 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 
GI index 0.70 0.72 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.88 
 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.15 
SALEG 0.19 0.25 0.21 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.22 0.04 
 0.38 0.48 0.46 0.30 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.42 0.38 0.45 0.28 
CAPITE 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 
 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
FSIZE 12.77 12.74 12.86 12.78 12.73 12.66 12.65 12.70 12.82 12.99 13.03 
 1.79 1.81 1.73 1.76 1.84 1.88 1.97 1.95 1.93 1.95 1.94 
LEV 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.22 
 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18 
R&D 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 
  
31 
 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Frequency of the Governance Index Scores 
 
Percentage Observations % of Sample 
0-20% 39 1.0% 
21-40% 104 2.7% 
41-60% 447 11.5% 
61-80% 1021 26.4% 
81-100% 2262 58.4% 
 3873 100% 
 
Table 4 
 
Lags on Corporate Performance 
 
In this table, we report results from the OLS estimation of equation 1. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-
clustered standard errors. Year and industry dummies are included in all regressions. P-values are reported in 
parentheses, whereas, ***;**;* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable ROA TQ ROA TQ 
Performance (-1) 0.632*** 0.632***   
  (0.000) (0.000)   
Performance (-2) 0.098** -0.019   
  (0.016) (0.774)   
Performance (-3) 0.015 0.133*** 0.369*** 0.342*** 
  (0.790) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
Performance (-4) 0.061* -0.020 0.146*** -0.009 
  (0.088) (0.444) (0.000) (0.672) 
SALESG 0.048*** -0.231** 0.056*** 0.056 
  (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.540) 
CAPITE 0.003 0.412 0.120* 0.770 
  (0.950) (0.226) (0.051) (0.233) 
FSIZE 0.002 -0.018 0.005** -0.031 
  (0.145) (0.102) (0.032) (0.162) 
LEV -0.018 0.042 -0.044** 0.098 
  (0.125) (0.762) (0.030) (0.732) 
R&D -0.206*** 2.94*** -0.502*** 4.46*** 
  (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R2 0.7255 0.6224 0.5252 0.3559 
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Table 5  
 
Relationship between the Corporate Governance Index, Control Variables, and Past ROA 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of current governance index (GI) and current control variables, 
on past performance and historic values of control variables (equation 2). Performance is measured by return on 
assets (ROA) in Panel (A) and Tobin’s Q (TQ) in panel (B). The control variables include sales growth (SALEG), 
capital expenditure (CAPITE), firm size (FSIZE), leverage (LEV) and R&D expenditure (R&D). All p-values are 
based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. Year and industry dummies are included in all regressions. P-
values are reported in parentheses, whereas, ***;**;* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Panel (A)  
Dependent Variable GI SALESG CAPITE FSIZE LEV R&D 
       
ROA(t-1) 0.084* -0.274*** 0.048*** 2.86*** -0.107* -0.155*** 
 (0.064) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.054) (0.000) 
SALESG(t-1) -0.028***  0.007** -0.203** -0.003 0.007** 
 (0.003)  (0.013) (0.027) (0.698) (0.044) 
CAPITE(t-1) 0.030 0.217  -2.77*** 0.455*** -0.008 
 (0.781) (0.260)  (0.010) (0.001) (0.752) 
FSIZE(t-1) 0.034*** -0.023*** -0.002**  0.032*** -0.003** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.029)  (0.000) (0.012) 
LEV(t-1) 0.029 -0.060 0.020 3.05***  -0.022** 
 (0.372) (0.191) (0.127) (0.000)  (0.042) 
R&D(t-1) 0.218 0.060 -0.027 -3.70*** -0.246*  
 (0.174) (0.773) (0.362) (0.004) (0.060)  
R2 0.2684 0.0736 0.1316 0.2764 0.2026 0.4090 
       
Panel (B) 
TQ(t-1) 0.006** 0.037*** 0.002* -0.095*** 0.001 0.008*** 
 (0.032) (0.000) (0.070) (0.008) (0.798) (0.000) 
SALESG(t -1) -0.028***  0.006** -0.182* -0.003 0.010** 
 (0.002)  (0.036) (0.071) (0.767) (0.017) 
CAPITE(t -1) 0.045 0.100  -1.97* 0.432*** -0.066** 
 (0.681) (0.602)  (0.062) (0.001) (0.028) 
FSIZE(t -1) 0.037*** -0.021*** -0.001  0.031*** -0.004** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.154)  (0.000) (0.012) 
LEV(t -1) 0.022 -0.088* 0.019 3.04***  -0.022** 
 (0.515) (0.052) (0.171) (0.000)  (0.036) 
R&D(t -1) 0.073 0.116 -0.087*** -5.05*** -0.227*  
 (0.616) (0.664) (0.001) (0.000) (0.055)  
R2 0.2675 0.0912 0.1242 0.2530 0.1571 0.3740 
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Table 6 
 
Test of Strict Exogeneity 
 
This table reports results from the fixed-effects estimation of the model in equation 3. All p-values are based on 
robust standard errors. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable: ROA in columns (1) 
and (2); Tobin’s Q in columns (3) and (4). P-values are reported in parentheses, whereas, ***;**;* represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable ROA ROA TQ TQ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
GI 0.027* 0.022 -0.230 -0.317 
  (0.093) (0.171) (0.593) 0.427) 
SALESG 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.374*** 0.262*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
CAPITE 0.172*** 0.084 2.33** 0.705 
  (0.003) (0.132) (0.017) (0.411) 
FSIZE -0.006 -0.043*** -0.762*** -1.57*** 
  (0.361) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV -0.065** -0.064** 0.516 1.43*** 
  (0.040) (0.027) (0.270) (0.002) 
R&D -0.657*** -0.760*** 0.498 1.147 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.886) (0.699) 
GI(t+1) 0.022 0.020 0.596 0.471 
  (0.247) (0.267) (0.126) (0.188) 
SALESG(t+1) 
 
-0.019***  0.289*** 
  
 
(0.002)  (0.002) 
CAPITE(t+1) 
 
0.254***  4.80*** 
  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
FSIZE(t+1) 
 
0.049***  1.217*** 
  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
LEV(t+1) 
 
0.033  -1.037** 
  
 
(0.210)  (0.025) 
R&D(t+1) 
 
0.258  -2.35 
  
 
(0.154)  (0.389) 
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Table 7 
 
The Effect of the Governance Index on Current ROA 
 
This table represents the results of static and dynamic models using return on assets (ROA) as a measure of 
corporate performance. Industry dummies are included in the OLS regressions, whereas, year dummies are 
included in all the regressions. Firm clustered standard errors are used in the fixed effects estimation. All t-statistics 
are based on robust standard errors. AR(2)  is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test of over-identification is under the null that all 
instruments are valid. Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is under the null that instruments used for the equations 
in levels are exogenous. P-values are reported in parentheses, whereas, ***;**;* represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. Confidence intervals at the 95% are presented in brackets whereas a represent 
confidence intervals at the 99%. 
 
Dependent Variable 
(ROA) 
         Static Model Dynamic Model 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
OLS 
Fixed Effects 
GMMa GMMb 
GI 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.030 
  (0.000) (0.007) (0.166) (0.139) (0.566) (0.183) 
SALESG 
-0.001 0.026*** 0.033*** 
[0.020,0.047] 
0.033*** 
[0.017, 0.048] 
0.019* 
[-0.001, 0.040] 
0.012 
  (0.852) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.068) (0.288) 
CAPITE 0.237*** 0.171*** -0.028 -0.040 -0.114 -0.155 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.381) (0.278) (0.219) (0.162) 
FSIZE 0.011*** -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.0001 -0.002 
  (0.000) (0.540) (0.110) (0.186) (0.974) (0.746) 
LEV 
-0.052*** -0.045 -0.019** 
 [-0.041, 0.004]a 
-0.022** 
 [-0.048, 0.003] a 
-0.039 -0.128*** 
[-0.207, -0.048] 
a 
  (0.001) (0.150) (0.035) (0.025) (0.172) (0.000) 
R&D 
-0.915*** -0.589*** -0.234*** 
[-0.375, -0.093] 
a 
-0.247*** 
[-0.400, -0.094] a 
-0.576*** 
[-0.879, -0.274]a 
-0.725*** 
[-1.054, -0.396] 
a 
  (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA(t-1) 
  
0.685*** 
[0.611, 0.759] 
0.672*** 
[0.603, 0.741] 
0.527*** 
[0.429, 0.625] 
0.511*** 
[0.411, 0.612] 
  
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
ROA(t-2) 
  
0.116*** 
[0.054, 0.178] 
0.113*** 
[0.059, 0.167] 
0.136*** 
[0.064, 0.207] 
0.152*** 
[0.078, 0.225] 
 
  
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R2 0.2765 0.1855 0.7311 0.7304 
 
 
AR(2) test (p-value) 
 
 0.317 0.208 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value) 
 
 0.236 0.280 
Diff-in-Hansen test of Exogeneity (p-value)   0.688 0.561 
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Table 8 
 
The Effect of Governance Index on Current Tobin’s Q 
 
This table represents results of static and dynamic models using Tobin’s Q (TQ) as a measure of corporate 
performance. Industry dummies are included in the OLS regressions, whereas, year dummies are included in all 
the regressions. All t-statistics are based on robust standard errors. Firm clustered standard errors are used in the 
fixed effects estimation. AR(2) is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under 
the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test of over-identification is under the null that all instruments are valid. 
Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is under the null that instruments used for the equations in levels are exogenous. 
P-values are reported in parentheses, whereas, ***;**;* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Confidence intervals at the 95% are presented in brackets. 
 
 Dependent 
Variable (TQ) 
        Static Model Dynamic Model 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
OLS Fixed Effects GMMa GMM
b
 
GI 0.349** 0.105 0.161 0.300 0.217 0.261 
  (0.036) (0.718) (0.182) (0.169) (0.636) (0.366) 
SALESG 0.310*** 0.183** 0.216*** -0.056 0.102 -0.029 
  (0.001) (0.017) (0.002) (0.555) (0.573) (0.852) 
CAPITE 0.870** 4.637*** 0.144 0.371 0.022 -0.164 
  (0.071) (0.000) (0.628) (0.470) (0.985) (0.886) 
FSIZE 
-0.124*** -0.426*** -0.030*** 
[-0.053, -0.008] 
-0.360*** 
[-0.526, -0.194] 
-0.109* 
[-0.222, 0.003] 
-0.109** 
[-0.211, -0.007] 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.057) (0.037) 
LEV 0.251 0.767** 0.082 0.023 -0.373 -0.286 
  (0.182) (0.044) (0.486) (0.940) (0.370) (0.429) 
R&D 
8.49*** 2.904 2.76*** 
[1.378, 4.141] 
4.75** 
[0.891, 8.609] 
3.58*** 
[1.348, 5.809] 
3.17*** 
[1.267, 5.083] 
  (0.000) (0.312) (0.000) (0.016) (0.002) (0.001) 
TQ(t-1) 
  
0.608*** 
[0.523, 0.694] 
0.325*** 
[0.254, 0.397] 
0.376*** 
[0.256, 0.496] 
0.374*** 
[0.254, 0.495] 
  
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TQ(t-2) 
  
-0.014 -0.061** -0.042 -0.040 
  
  
(0.642) (0.026) (0.214) (0.230) 
R2 0.2451 0.1227 0.5694 0.2942 
 
 
AR(2) test (p-value)  0.130 0.130 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value)  0.075 0.117 
Diff-in-Hansen tests of Exogeneity (p-value)  0.955 0.994 
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Table 9 
The Impact of Lagged Governance Index on Current Performance 
 
All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. Industry dummies are included in the OLS 
regressions, whereas, year dummies are included in all the regressions. AR(2) is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test of over-
identification is under the null that all instruments are valid. Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is under the null 
that instruments used for the equations in levels are exogenous. ***;**;* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
  
  Performance (ROA)     Performance (TQ) 
  Pooled  
OLS 
System  
GMMa 
Pooled  
OLS 
System  
GMM
b
 
GI(t-1) -0.004 -0.012 0.098 0.465 
  (0.690) (0.641) (0.449) (0.171) 
SALESG(t-1) -0.011** -0.013 0.060 0.166 
  (0.040) (0.125) (0.276) (0.240) 
CAPITE(t-1) -0.035 -0.067 -0.251 -0.474 
  (0.142) (0.467) (0.479) (0.685) 
FSIZE(t-1) -0.000 -0.003 -0.012 -0.104* 
  (0.964) (0.378) (0.357) (0.057) 
LEV(t-1) 0.023*** 0.022 0.051 -1.07*** 
  (0.003) (0.301) (0.711) (0.008) 
R&D(t-1) 0.005 -0.104 2.38*** 3.55*** 
  (0.925) (0.510) (0.007) (0.007) 
Performance(t-1) 0.748*** 0.649*** 0.597*** 0.332*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Performance(t-2) 0.108*** 0.154*** -0.003 -0.054 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.921) (0.206) 
R2 0.7296 
 
0.5607  
AR(2) test (p-value) 
 
0.517 
 
0.256 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value) 
 
0.284 
 
0.176 
Diff-in-Hansen test of Exogeneity (p-value) 
 
0.164 
 
0.877 
 
 
